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SIGNS OF THINGS TO COME: INTER-AGENCY 
COORDINATION, SHARED EVIDENCE, AND 
WIRETAPS IN PROSECUTING WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME 
 
by 
Natalie Bordeaux* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although wiretapping suspects and coordinated 
investigations by law enforcement to prosecute wrongdoers are 
tactics commonly used for so-called blue-collar crimes, the 
economic collapse of 2008 spurred a new wave of ingenuity on 
the part of the federal government in deterring and punishing 
white-collar crime, particularly fraud.  It wasn’t that any of the 
investigative techniques used were novel, as all of the methods 
had already existed.  Rather, law enforcement’s approach was 
fresh because its fact-gathering tools were rarely used for 
white-collar crime before, and never employed as successfully 
as in the parallel civil and criminal actions against Raj 
Rajaratnam and others within his circle for insider trading.  
Through inter-agency collaboration and wiretapping1, the 
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) prosecuted and fined perpetrators of  
__________________ 
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what had been described as the “largest hedge fund insider 
trading case in history”.2   
The “largest hedge fund insider trading case” was actually 
two cases: United States v. Rajaratnam,3 and SEC v. Galleon 
Management, LP.4  Both cases resulted from an organized 
investigation by the DOJ and the SEC that uncovered a ring of 
powerful, wealthy members of the financial industry engaged 
in insider trading.5  Raj Rajaratnam, Manager of Galleon 
Management LP (hereinafter, “Galleon”), a hedge-fund 
advisory firm, was convicted of fourteen counts of conspiracy 
to commit and actual commission of insider trading.6  In the 
criminal action, Rajaratnam was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison, ordered to forfeit $53.8 million, and was fined an 
additional $10 million in criminal penalties.7  At the time, 
Rajaratnam’s sentence was the longest ever imposed in an 
insider trading case.8  In the civil action commenced by the 
SEC, District Court Judge Jed Rakoff imposed a civil penalty 
of $92,805,705 on Raj Rajaratnam.9    
In both the criminal and civil cases, defense counsel raised 
numerous challenges, including the government’s ability to 
wiretap the defendants’ telephones, and utilize intercepted calls 
as evidence of wrongdoing.  Nevertheless, the DOJ and SEC 
prevailed in their actions against the defendants for conspiring 
to engage in insider trading and committing insider trading.  
Their success was founded largely upon the use of wiretapped 
conversations between the defendants, and cooperation 
between the SEC and the United States Attorney’s Office 
(“USAO”)10.   
This article will provide an overview of the Rajaratnam 
cases, and explain key procedural and substantive issues it 
presented, including the fundamental requirements for lawfully 
obtaining wiretaps, the investigative and enforcement process 
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for securities violations, and the increasing communication 
between federal agencies regarding white-collar criminal 
investigations.  The article concludes that the efficiencies 
afforded by wiretapping and the pooling of administrative 
resources in fact-gathering will lead to an increase in 
enforcement actions and penalties. 
UNITED STATES V. RAJARATNAM11 AND SEC V. 
GALLEON MANAGEMENT, LP12 
On October 16, 2009, the USAO and the SEC filed 
criminal and civil complaints, respectively, against Raj 
Rajaratnam and other defendants13 for insider trading.14  The 
USAO unsealed criminal complaints charging Raj Rajaratnam 
and other defendants with conspiracy and insider trading under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193415, and 
Rule 10b-516.   
Both complaints involved the same conduct,17 and a 
significant portion of evidence introduced in each case was 
obtained from wiretapping the communications of several 
defendants.18   Members of Rajaratnam’s ring included 
personal friends Rajiv Goel and Anil Kumar, and a former 
employee, Roomy Khan.19  At the outset, many of the facts 
surrounding trades made by Rajaratnam on Galleon’s behalf 
appeared remarkably fortuitous.  However, upon closer 
inspection, the trades served as strong evidence establishing the 
commission of both civil and criminal violations involving the 
unlawful use of material, non-public information.   
Rajaratnam had enlisted the aid of Roomy Khan to obtain 
“material, non-public information” regarding earnings, 
acquisitions and business agreements of numerous publicly-
traded corporations, including Google, Hilton Hotels 
Corporation, Intel and Sprint Nextel Corporation.20  As 
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Rajaratnam’s criminal conduct continued, law enforcement and 
the SEC were able to identify a large quantity of information to 
corroborate suspicions surrounding Galleon’s financial success.  
For instance, Khan (who provided Rajaratnam with 
confidential information regarding Polycom,21 the sale of 
Kronos22 to a private equity firm,23 the acquisition of Hilton by 
the Blackstone Group, and Google’s earnings reports), traded 
on the information herself before the information became 
public, and very close in time to Rajaratnam’s subsequent 
activity on the stock, personally, and on Galleon’s behalf.24  
Additionally, Rajaratnam purchased Hilton shares to capitalize 
on the information that Khan had provided regarding an 
upcoming acquisition of Hilton by the Blackstone Group25 on 
behalf of the Galleon Tech Funds, an unusual investment for 
funds whose objective is to invest in the technology sector.26  
Yet there was still more information to establish 
Rajaratnam’s illegal activities.  After Rajiv Goel provided 
Rajaratnam with insider information concerning Intel’s 
earnings, and a business endeavor involving Sprint Nextel 
Corporation and Clearwire Corporation,27 Rajaratnam 
rewarded Goel by trading on Goel’s account, using insider 
information concerning the imminent Hilton takeover, and 
other companies’ information.28 
Danielle Chiesi, portfolio manager at New Castle, used 
several tips she received to trade on New Castle’s behalf, and 
shared the information with other individuals, including 
Rajaratnam.29  Chiesi traded on material nonpublic information 
obtained from an Akamai Technologies, Inc. executive, and 
shared this information with Mark Kurland, and Rajaratnam, 
who traded on behalf of himself and Galleon using this 
information.30  
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Chiesi also received several tips from Robert Moffat, a 
senior executive of IBM, which she used in trading on behalf 
of New Castle.  Moffat provided Chiesi with material 
nonpublic information regarding the earnings of IBM and Sun 
Microsystems, Inc., along with negotiations between AMD31 
and two companies based in Abu Dhabi.32 
Additionally, communications between several of the 
defendants were ongoing, and/or extremely close in time with 
changes in investments.  For instance, Rajaratnam contacted 
Goel on January 8, 2007, about one week before Intel’s 
earnings information regarding the fourth quarter of 2006 was 
to be released.33  On January 9, 2007, Rajaratnam began 
buying Intel shares on his own behalf and that of Galleon.34  
Over the course of the Martin Luther King Day weekend, 
Rajaratnam and Goel were in repeated communication.35  
When the markets reopened on Tuesday, January 16, 2007, 
both defendants suddenly altered their investment strategies 
regarding Intel, with Galleon selling its entire long position in 
Intel.36  In its complaint, the SEC cites numerous examples of 
continued communication coinciding with very pointed 
changes in investing by defendants Rajaratnam, Galleon, 
Chiesi, Kurland, New Castle, and Goel.37    
AUTHORIZATION OF WIRETAPS PURSUANT TO 
TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND 
SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 
An Overview on the Use of Wiretaps 
Today, the term “wiretapping” refers to electronic or 
mechanical eavesdropping38, a sweeping description that 
includes the surveillance of voice, e-mail, fax, and internet 
communications.39  Other than certain enumerated exceptions 
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described below, wiretapping is illegal and yields inadmissible 
evidence. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions 
regarding law enforcement’s use of wiretapped conversations.  
Although several earlier cases had ruled upon the permissibility 
of intercepted conversations,40 the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Berger v. New York41 and Katz v. United States42 confirmed 
that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
search and seizures43 applied to intercepted communications in 
places where an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.44   
In Berger, the petitioner’s conviction for conspiring to 
bribe the Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority 
was based solely on recorded conversations using a planted 
“bug” in the office of an attorney allegedly involved in the 
bribery scheme.45  The Court held that law enforcement must 
abide by the Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant 
based upon probable cause before recording conversations in 
an individual’s home or office.46   
The holding in Katz went a step further than Berger, 
extending Fourth Amendment protection to any location where 
an individual may “justifiably” expect to have a private 
conversation.47  In Katz, the petitioner’s conviction for 
interstate gambling by wire communication was based, in part, 
upon evidence submitted by the Government of the petitioner’s 
portion of conversations recorded using a device attached to 
the outside of the public telephone booth where the petitioner 
had placed his bets.  The Supreme Court confirmed that the 
determination as to the admissibility of oral evidence required 
the same analysis as conducted for physical evidence.48  
Additionally, the Court dismissed the notion that physical 
intrusion of a recording device was required for resulting 
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recordings to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.49  After 
Berger and Katz, law enforcement needed rules for permissible 
electronic surveillance.      
Added Guidance: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 196850 
In response to these holdings, Congress undertook its own 
efforts to define a clearer standard for law enforcement.  
Congressional research found that unauthorized and 
nonconsensual wiretapped communications were being used as 
evidence in courts and administrative agencies by both 
governmental and private parties, in violation of individuals’ 
privacy rights. 51   
As a result of these findings, Congress enacted Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, also 
known as the “Wiretap Act”.52  At its inception, the Wiretap 
Act sought to balance the privacy interests of private persons 
with the needs of law enforcement in intercepting 
communications to prosecute individuals engaged in criminal 
activity.53  This legislation made unauthorized or 
nonconsensual interceptions of wire or oral communications 
illegal.54  Additionally, it delineated specific requirements for 
government officials to satisfy to obtain wiretap authorizations, 
and regulated the use of such interceptions.   
Statutory Requirements for Lawful Wiretapping 
Permissible use of wiretaps by government agents is 
comparable to any other governmental search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment, as law enforcement must obtain 
authorization to intercept communications in places where an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 
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There are several ways in which law enforcement may 
legally intercept wire, oral or electronic communications.  For 
instance, a “person acting under color of law” may utilize a 
wiretap if a party to the communication or where prior consent 
has been given by one of the parties engaged in the 
communication.56   
The Wiretap Act also permits application by both federal 
and state law enforcement agencies to the appropriate judges 
for authorization of a wiretap.57  Such application requires 
great detail in order to avoid granting unfettered discretion to 
law enforcement in its use of wiretaps.  Supporting information 
required for any wiretap authorization is similar to that of a 
regular warrant application in that the application must be 
made under oath,58 with a specific description of the facts and 
circumstances upon which the applicant relies59 as showing 
probable cause to believe that specific offenses have or are 
being committed.60  The application must describe the type of 
communication which authorities seek to intercept,61 and the 
identity of the person, when known, whose communications 
are to be wiretapped.62   
However, the applicant must also provide a “a full and 
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative 
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous”.63  As any wiretapping authorization is to be as 
narrow in scope as possible, authorizations must describe the 
type of communications to be intercepted,64 the location where 
the authority to intercept is given,65 the agency possessing the 
authority to conduct such interceptions,66 and the period of 
time for which interception is permissible by the order.67  
Additionally, the order must include a provision requiring the 
interception to “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the 
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interception of communications not otherwise subject to 
interception” pursuant to the Wiretap Act.68   
Despite the utmost precision with which wiretapping 
authority is given, and a lengthy list of offenses for which 
interception is authorized, the Wiretap Act enables law 
enforcement to use information obtained from otherwise lawful 
intercepts regarding offenses for which authorization was not 
granted or those offenses that are not specifically listed in the 
Wiretap Act as lawful grounds upon which wiretapping is 
permissible.69  As will be discussed below, the United States 
Attorneys’ Office procured a lawful intercept for an 
investigation of wire fraud (an enumerated offense in the 
Wiretap Act), and obtained admissible evidence establishing 
charges of insider trading in the Rajaratnam case.    
Furthermore, the Wiretap Act permits law enforcement to 
share the information obtained from authorized interceptions 
with other members of law enforcement.70  Cooperation is now 
increasingly likely between several federal enforcement 
agencies, including the United States Department of the 
Treasury, the DOJ and the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, as will be discussed below. 
Issues Presented by the Rajaratnam Cases 
Unlisted Offenses: 
In the criminal action brought against Raj Rajaratnam and 
others, Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi moved to suppress the 
recorded conversations obtained by the DOJ pursuant to Title 
III on several grounds.  First, Rajaratnam and Chiesi sought 
exclusion of the wiretapped calls from evidence because 
insider trading was not an offense enumerated in Title III for 
which a wiretap was permissible.71  In its application, the 
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government requested wiretap authorization for investigation 
of wire fraud, an enumerated offense for which recording 
conversations is authorized.72 District Court Judge Richard 
Holwell rejected this contention, noting that although Title III 
only authorizes the use of wiretaps for offenses listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 2516, it does not bar evidence obtained during the 
course of a lawful wiretap for unlisted offenses, so long as 
wiretap applications were obtained in good faith and “not as a 
subterfuge for gathering evidence of other offenses.”73  Judge 
Holwell found the DOJ’s applications to be very transparent, 
detailing the insider trading plot, and setting forth the evidence 
they had obtained that established probable cause to believe 
that wire fraud and money laundering had been committed.74  
Thus, the government’s investigation was conducted in good 
faith, and evidence obtained by the wiretapped conversations 
which established securities fraud was a “by-product” of 
lawfully procuring evidence of wire fraud.75    
Probable Cause: 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi also argued that the government’s 
applications and supporting affidavits failed to show probable 
cause as to the necessity of the wiretaps.76  Rajaratnam argued 
that the wiretap application and supporting documentation 
falsely characterized co-defendant Roomy Khan as a credible 
source, and misconstrued other evidence in the application.77 
Judge Holwell rejected this challenge, noting that the 
government’s application provided information that 
corroborated Ms.  Khan’s allegations that she had given 
Rajaratnam insider information on Polycom, Hilton, Google 
and Kronos.78  Specifically, Khan’s claims were validated by 
Rajaratnam’s own statements to Khan in conversations she had 
recorded at the request of the FBI.79  
Full Statement of Other Attempted Investigative Procedures: 
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Rajaratnam and Chiesi both sought suppression of the 
recordings on the grounds that the wiretap applications did not 
comply with Title III’s requirement of a “full and complete 
statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures 
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”80  This 
argument also failed, as Judge Holwell noted that the 
requirement was not one of exhaustion of all other 
investigative methods, but rather, communication with the 
authorizing judge about the investigation’s progress and 
difficulties corresponding with employing regular law 
enforcement tactics.81  Where an application shows that less 
invasive methods are unlikely to succeed or are impractical, 
such facts will satisfy the requirements of Section 2518(1)(c).82 
Minimization Requirement: 
Both Rajaratnam and Chiesi also challenged the 
introduction of several wiretaps, arguing that the government 
failed to minimize conversations that were not relevant to the 
investigation, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).83  Judge 
Holwell noted that the wiretap authorizations properly included 
the minimization order, and that the law enforcement agents 
worked to reasonably minimize the interception of irrelevant 
conversations.84  Furthermore, the Court recognized that an 
investigation involving a large-scale conspiracy requiring 
“more extensive surveillance may be justified in an attempt to 
determine the precise scope of the enterprise.”85 
Rajaratnam’s Motions for Acquittal: 
Subsequent to these challenges, Rajaratnam sought 
acquittal on all 14 charges against him at three different points 
in the trial: (1) at the close of the prosecution’s case; (2) after 
all evidence had been presented; and (3) after a jury verdict 
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found him guilty of all 14 charges (five counts of conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud, and nine counts of securities fraud).86  
Amidst multiple arguments submitted regarding Rajaratnam’s 
conviction, Rajaratnam’s attorneys contended that his 
conviction on several conspiracy counts was based solely upon 
indirect evidence from the wiretapped conversations and that 
such conversations were inadmissible hearsay evidence.87  
Both arguments were rejected.  Pursuant to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, a co-conspirator’s statements made “during the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” are not considered 
hearsay.88  Furthermore, the government was able to provide 
additional evidence corroborating statements made, notably, 
changes in Rajaratnam’s investment positions within very short 
time periods subsequent to calls made and information he 
obtained therefrom.89      
The SEC’s Discovery Demands for Wiretapped Conversations 
from Rajaratnam and Chiesi: 
In the course of the criminal proceedings commenced 
against the defendants, the USAO had given Rajaratnam and 
Chiesi the wiretap recordings that they intended to use at trial; 
however, the prosecutors had not shared these recordings with 
the SEC.90  Since certain recordings were in the possession of 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi, the SEC sought to obtain production of 
the recordings through discovery demands, which both 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi opposed.91  Although there was no 
dispute that such recordings would normally be discoverable, 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi challenged the requests.  They claimed 
that they were unable to provide the SEC with the recordings 
because Title III prohibited disclosure of interceptions not 
explicitly permitted by statute, stemming from Congress’ 
privacy concerns in enacting Title III.92 
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Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York noted 
that 18 U.S.C. § 2517 had been amended in 1970 to enable 
anyone who had lawfully obtained wiretap recordings to 
disclose the contents of such recordings “while giving 
testimony in any proceeding held under the authority of the 
United States or of any State or political subdivision thereof.”93  
In granting the SEC’s demand for production of the recordings, 
Judge Rakoff observed:  
[T]he notion that only one party to a litigation should 
have access to some of the most important non-
privileged evidence bearing directly on the case runs 
counter to basic principles of civil discovery in an 
adversary system and therefore should not readily be 
inferred, at least not when the party otherwise left in 
ignorance is a government agency charged with civilly 
enforcing the very same provisions that are the subject 
of the parallel criminal cases arising from the same 
transactions.94   
Privacy concerns were addressed by the court’s issuance of 
a protective order barring disclosure of the recordings to any 
non-party to the case until a court of competent jurisdiction 
ruled on a suppression motion regarding such disclosure.95 
INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION OF 
INVESTIGATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME CASES 
The SEC is authorized to investigate potential securities 
violations using administrative, civil, and/or criminal 
remedies.96  The SEC may employ civil and/or administrative 
actions to enforce the relevant federal laws.97  However, only 
the DOJ may pursue a criminal action for these violations.98   
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The investigation surrounding Rajaratnam and his co-
defendants showed that the ultimate success in prosecuting 
Rajaratnam and others resulted from the complimentary 
investigative approaches of the SEC and DOJ.  The SEC had 
employed conventional investigational tools to expose 
Rajaratnam’s insider trading circle and was unable to unearth 
the scheme to its fullest extent because the suspects had carried 
out their violations by telephone.99  It was through the DOJ’s 
efforts that wiretaps were authorized,100 and resulting recorded 
conversations served as key evidence against the defendants.101  
The Authority of the SEC 
The Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 prohibit a 
number of securities-related activities.102  Congress has given 
the SEC the authority to promulgate rules and regulations 
pertaining to such activities.103 
After monitoring suspicious market activity, receiving a 
complaint, or a referral from other SEC divisions or other 
sources, the SEC’s Enforcement Division may commence an 
informal investigation of possible securities violations.104  
Upon completion of the initial review and identifying 
violations, the Enforcement Division prepares a “formal 
investigative order”, which requires only a non-adherence to 
securities laws.105  The Enforcement Division is able to issue 
subpoenas, and order production of documents.106  At the 
conclusion of the Enforcement Division’s investigative 
presentation, the Commission may authorize the Enforcement 
Division to file a claim in federal district court or seek 
administrative action.107 
Administrative proceedings are conducted before an 
Administrative Law Judge or the SEC.108  Where a successful 
showing of securities violations is made by a preponderance of 
15 / Vol 31 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
 
the evidence, the SEC may seek to enjoin wrongdoers from 
continuing to engage in wrongful conduct,109 impose fines,110 
and/or order disgorgement.111 
The Role of the United States Attorney’s Office in 
Securities-Based Crimes 
As mentioned above, the SEC lacks the authority to impose 
criminal sanctions on violators.  Such proceedings must be 
commenced by the United States Attorney’s Office within the 
Department of Justice.112  The SEC rules enable the USAO to 
access its investigation files, preventing bureaucratic 
inefficiency from hampering an investigation.113 
A securities-based criminal action has stronger 
investigative techniques at its disposal, including the use of 
search warrants,114 and the USAO’s ability to determine the 
scope of discovery, without interference of the defendants.115  
Although the USAO’s actions are generally initiated after a 
referral from the SEC,116 the DOJ is not bound by, or reliant 
solely upon, information from the SEC.117  Thus, the USAO 
may commence criminal actions in situations where the SEC 
has either declined to pursue civil or administrative remedies, 
or where violations, while related to securities, are not within 
the purview of the SEC’s enforcement efforts.118 
The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force 
On the heels of the cooperation between the SEC and the 
DOJ in investigating Rajaratnam and numerous others 
allegedly involved in his insider trading ring, the government 
sent a strong message to would-be violators that joint 
investigative and enforcement efforts were the new normal.  By 
Executive Order dated November 17, 2009, President Barack 
Obama established the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
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Force (the “Task Force”).119  The Task Force, led by the 
Department of Justice, includes senior-level members of 
numerous federal agencies, and departments, including the 
SEC, the Department of Treasury, the Criminal Investigation 
Division of the IRS, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).120    
The Task Force’s main purpose is to advise the Attorney 
General on investigating and prosecuting a variety of fraud 
cases.121  Additionally, the Task Force is expected to 
“coordinate law enforcement operations” with state and local 
law enforcement.122  As SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro 
explained, “Many financial frauds are complicated puzzles that 
require painstaking efforts to piece together.  By formally 
coordinating our efforts, we will be able to better identify the 
pieces, assemble the puzzle, and put an end to the fraud.”123 
CONCLUSION 
The accomplishments of the SEC and DOJ in unraveling 
Raj Rajaratnam’s insider trading ring sounded a loud and clear 
warning to white-collar criminals – federal agencies are now 
working together, sharing their information, and using new 
investigative methods to build and bolster their cases.  While 
some may characterize the use of recorded conversations in the 
Rajaratnam cases as historically insignificant, it is clear that 
neither the DOJ nor the SEC would have triumphed in the 
actions commenced against Rajaratnam and others without 
those communications.  Given the number of defendants that 
were fined and/or sentenced because of the admissible 
wiretapped evidence, it is highly probable that enforcement 
agencies will seek to intercept communications in future 
investigations.  If anything, the decisions in the Rajaratnam 
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cases have refined the wiretapping standards propounded by 
Title III.  
The SEC’s and DOJ’s combined resources and pooled 
efforts in the Rajaratnam cases are also significant.  The 
agencies’ coordination in these cases exemplified the aims of 
the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force – to aggressively 
and efficiently prosecute white-collar crime.  The image 
presented by the Task Force is that of a unified movement to 
protect the public, and punish fraud.  If this Task Force 
succeeds, this is the dawn of a new era, one with strong 
enforcement, and without red tape.  
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penalty that will deprive this defendant of a material part of his fortune.”  
Id. 
10 “Our law enforcement agencies are together much more than the sum 
of our parts. That is why coordination, of which today’s actions are a prime 
example, is critically important to the goal of rooting out fraud and 
misconduct in our markets. The investing public deserves no less, and we 
will deliver.” Robert Khuzami, Remarks at Press Conference Regarding 
Rajaratnam Case (Oct. 16, 2009) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch101609rk.htm). 
11 United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 
2009).  
12 SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009). 
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13 The other defendants in these cases were: (1) Galleon Management, LP 
(the hedge fund management firm that was managed by Rajaratnam); (2) 
Rajiv Goel (Rajaratnam’s friend, and Managing Director at Intel Corp.); (3) 
Anil Kumar (Rajaratnam’s friend, investor in several Galleon funds, and a 
director at McKinsey & Co.); (4) Danielle Chiesi (a portfolio manager at 
New Castle Funds LLC); (5) Mark Kurland (Senior Managing Director and 
General Partner at New Castle Funds, LLC); (6) Robert Moffat (a senior 
executive at IBM); (7) New Castle Funds, LLC (an investment adviser to 
hedge funds which was previously a part of Bear Stearns Asset 
Management); (8) Roomy Khan (a hedge fund consultant); (9) Deep Shah 
(a former Moody’s analyst); (10) Ali Hariri (Vice President of Broadband 
Carrier Networking at Atheros, a “developer of semiconductor systems for 
network communication products”); (11) Schottenfeld Group LLC (a New 
York-based registered broker-dealer); (12)  Zvi Goffer (a registered 
representative and proprietary trader at Schottenfeld during the period 
investigated); (13) David Plate (a registered representative and proprietary 
trader at Schottenfeld); (14) Gautham Shankar (registered representative 
and proprietary trader at Schottenfeld); (15) S2 Capital Management, LP (a 
New York-based unregistered hedge fund investment adviser); (16) Steven 
Fortuna (principal and founder of S2 Capital Management, LP); (17) Ali T. 
Far (Managing Member of Spherix Capital and Far & Lee, LLC, and 
previously worked for Galleon as a Managing Director, portfolio manager, 
and analyst).; (18) Choo-Beng Lee (Managing Member of Far & Lee, LLC., 
and co-founder of Spherix Capital) (19) Spherix Capital (a California-based, 
unregistered hedge-fund investment adviser established by Far and Lee); 
and (20) Far & Lee (trading entity created by Lee and Far before 
establishing Spherix Capital, LLC.  SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP 
(No. 09-CV-0811-JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended 
Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009), amended by Second Amended 
Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).  Excluding Rajaratnam and Galleon 
Management, LP, all of the defendants served as sources of material, non-
public information to Rajaratnam who, in turn, traded on behalf of Galleon 
based upon such information.  Id.  All named individuals were defendants 
in criminal actions commenced by the USAO.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009); United States v. 
Moffat, No. 10 Cr. 270 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009); United States v. Goel, 
No. 10 Cr. 90 (BSJ) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009); United States v. Hariri, No. 09 
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MAG. 2436 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2009); and United States v. Goffer, No. 100 Cr. 
56 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009).   
14 The USAO also indicted other defendants in a separate criminal action, 
as a result of information they obtained during the Rajaratnam 
investigation.  SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 164-65 (2d Cir. Sep 29. 
2010). See also United States v. Goffer, 756 F.Supp.2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
The SEC filed a civil complaint against Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta on 
October 26, 2011, separate from the complaint filed against Rajaratnam 
described above.  This case was also based upon evidence obtained from 
wiretapped conversations, corroborated by investment changes.  SEC v. 
Gupta, No. 11 Cv. 7566 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011).   
15 Pursuant to Section 10(b), it is “unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange – (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security registered on a national securities exchange…any 
manipulative device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”  Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) (2012), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
16 Codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2012), which prohibits “any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud…”  Aside from insiders possessing a fiduciary duty, insider trading 
restrictions also apply to recipients of insider information from such 
insiders.  United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F.Supp.2d 491, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (citing SEC v. Ballesteros Franco, 253 F. Supp.2d 720, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)).  
17Although both the civil and criminal complaints alleged violations of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934(15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 
(2012)), and Rule 10b-5 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2012)), the 
criminal complaint also alleged that the defendants had conspired to 
commit insider trading.  United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH) 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009).   
18 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP (No. 09-CV-0811-JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
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2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010); 
United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009).   
19 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP (No. 09-CV-0811-JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).   
20 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).  
21 Polycom is a corporation that “produces applications for voice, video and 
data networking”.  SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 
8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 29, 2010).   
22Kronos is a “workforce management software company” that sells time 
tracking and payroll software to businesses.  ABOUT KRONOS, 
http://www.kronos.com/about/about-kronos.aspx (last visited January 9, 
2013); SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 5, 2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 
2010).  
23 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).  
24 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).  
Khan also compensated Deep Shah, the Moody’s analyst who had provided 
this information, with $10,000.  Shah was reviewing Hilton’s 
creditworthiness in furtherance of the takeover.  Id. 
25 As described by Shah, the contemplated Hilton takeover by the 
Blackstone Group would remove Hilton’s stock from the New York Stock 
Exchange, resulting in it becoming a private company.  This tip was 
accurate.  The Blackstone Group bought back all of Hilton’s stock at a 
premium.  Id.  
26 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010). 
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27 Clearwire constructs and operates wireless and broadband networks 
worldwide.  SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 5, 2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 
2010). 
28 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 “AMD is a global semiconductor company offering microprocessor, 
embedded processor, chipset and graphics products.”  SEC Complaint, SEC 
v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), 
amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009), amended by 
Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).  
32 Id. 
33 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 SEC Complaint, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Cv. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 16, 2009), amended by First Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009), amended by Second Amended Complaint (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010). 
37 The SEC filed a civil complaint against Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta on 
October 26, 2011, separate from the complaint filed against Rajaratnam 
described above.  This case was also based upon evidence obtained from 
wiretapped conversations, corroborated by investment changes.  Gupta, a 
former Board Member of Procter & Gamble, and Goldman Sachs, as well as 
a former Director of McKinsey, was found to have provided Rajaratnam 
with material nonpublic information concerning Goldman Sachs and 
Procter & Gamble.  SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Cv. 7566 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 
2011).  Gupta was found guilty of insider trading in the criminal action 
commenced by the USAO, and sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, 
and fined $5 million.  United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45610 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2012), sentence imposed by 
United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154226 
(S.D.N.Y. 0ct. 24, 2012). 
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38 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 769 (9th ed. 2009). 
39 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (1), (2), (5), (12), (14), & (17) (2012). 
40 See, e.g. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that 
oral evidence obtained from an unwarranted intrusion may be 
inadmissible as the result of an impermissible search). 
41 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
42 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 374 (1967). 
43 “The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
44 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). 
45 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1967). 
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U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, Pub. L. 90-351 (1968), as amended by Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. 99-508 (1986), Communications 
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-414 (1994), Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132 (1996), USA 
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56 (2001), USA PATRIOT Additional 
Reauthorization Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-178 (2006), Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.110-
261 (2008), FISA Sunsets Extension Act, Pub. L. 112-3 (2011), PATRIOT 
Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-14 (2011).  
51 Pub. L. 90-351 (1968). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, enacted in 1986, amended 
the Wiretap Act to include interception of electronic communications.  
Pub. L. 99-508 (1986). 
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55 Notwithstanding the overall similarities between wiretap authorizations 
and conventional warrants, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States 
noted that “a conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect 
of an intended search” and that advance notice to a suspect of 
governmental intent to record his conversations would render such 
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